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AND THEN SUDDENLY SEATTLE
UNIVERSITY WAS ON ITS WAY TO A
PARALLEL, INTEGRATIVE CURRICULUM
JOHN B. MITCHELL, BETSY R. HOLLINGSWORTH,
PATRICIA HALL CLARK, AND RAVEN LIDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a story of change so sudden that it surprised even those
who most fervently sought it. For nearly a decade, Seattle University
School of Law' has offered an extensive typical skills curriculum. All
students are involved in an intensive two year writing program.2 The
simulated Comprehensive Pretrial and Trial Advocacy Program trains
over 150 students a year,3 while in the Law Practice Clinic, 60 students
a year represent domestic and criminal clients. Course offerings such
as ADR, Negotiations, and Appellate Advocacy, along with judicial
and public service externships and an array of student competitions,
fill out the lawyering skills offerings. All was well done, well con-
* The authors are Clinical Professors at Seattle University Law School.
1 The law school changed its affiliation from University of Puget Sound to Seattle Uni-
versity in August, 1994.
2 In 1981, our faculty approved expanding the Legal Writing Program into what has
subsequently become a national model for legal writing programs. Students take six cred-
its of legal writing: a three-credit course in the first year in objective and advisory writing
and a three-credit course in the second year in persuasive writing and oral advocacy. Both
courses use pedagogical approaches derived from current research in rhetoric and writing
instruction, and both are taught by full-time faculty formally trained to teach legal writing.
The primary textbook for both courses is The Legal Writing Handbook, written by Laurel
Oates, Anne Enquist, and Kelly Kunsch, all of Seattle University Law School. The Hand-
book integrates research, analysis, and writing, using the comprehensive approach for
which the Legal Writing Program is known. Upper-division advanced legal writing semi-
nars are also available as electives. Seattle University Law School hosted the first national
conference for legal writing faculty in 1984. At that conference, the Legal Writing Institute
was founded as a professional association of legal writing faculty. Since 1984, the Institute,
which is located at Seattle University Law School, has grown to over 1400 members from
over 100 law schools, and it has held six national conferences, three of which were hosted
at Seattle University Law School. The Legal Writing Institute also publishes a newsletter
and journal.
3 The Comprehensive Trial Advocacy program was developed using a methodology
and a set of materials guided by current learning theory and expert-novice schema theory.
See Marilyn J. Berger & John B. Mitchell, Rethinking Advocacy Training, 16 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 821 (1993). The students study from a text by Professors Mitchell and Berger, and
Ronald Clark, a Senior Prosecuting Attorney with the King County Prosecutor. See
MARILYN J. BERGER, JOHN B. MITCHELL & RONALD CLARK, PRETRIAjL ADVOCACY:
PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY (1988); MARILYN J. BERGER, JOHN B. MITCHELL &
RONALD CLARK, TRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND STRATEGY (1989).
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ceived, staple clinical fare. Then something happened. These pro-
grams remain, but woven throughout the course offerings is what we
call a Parallel, Integrative Curriculum: One-credit live-client and sim-
ulated course components running parallel to related upper-level sub-
stantive courses. 4 This article is about that curriculum and, as
importantly, how it came into being.
A. A Brief Description of the Current Status of the Parallel,
Integrative Curriculum
Currently, live-client components are offered in conjunction with
regular courses taught by regular faculty. Students registered for
these regular courses are lotteried into a one-credit mini-clinic to han-
dle real cases in the areas of: Health Law (appeals of Medicaid ser-
vice denials for indigent clients); Immigration Law (representation of
clients in deportation hearings); Law & Psychiatry (representation of
patients at mental commitment hearings); Professional Responsibility
(investigation of and recommendations on bar complaints); and Trusts
& Estates (drafting of wills and powers of attorney for elderly and
AIDs clients). A sixth such component, to be offered in conjunction
with the Housing Law course, is being developed under a grant from
the Department of Education.5 Clinic students working in teams of
two, get initial intensive training on the specific relevant law and pro-
cedure, and on-going supervision, from a clinical faculty member.
On the simulated side, Drafting Lab is offered to students in a
4 Other teachers and institutions have used a structure where students in a substantive
course are simultaneously offered a clinical experience. Some have used field placements.
See, e.g., Paul Bergman, The Consumer Protection Clinical Course at UCLA School of
Law, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352 (1978) (students in seminar simultaneously do clinical work
in which case supervision is provided by agency personnel); Howard R. Sacks, Student
Fieldwork as a Technique in Educating Law Students in Professional Responsibility, 20 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 291, 295 (1968) (students in professional responsibility seminar do fieldwork
research). In others, regular faculty supervise the clinical component. See, e.g., Barbara
Bezdeck, Legal Theory and Practice at the Maryland School of Law, 93 AALS SECION ON
CLINICAL EDUCATION NEWSTTrER, at 13 (Dec. 1993) (LTP curriculum, which ties class-
work and actual client representation experience, covering most first-year and a number of
upper-level courses); Sanford J. Fox & Edleff H. Schwabb, Comments on a Bail Project
Seminar, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 102 (1966) (students in seminar on bail simultaneously do
some intake and observation in bail process). Interestingly, as early as 1953, some were
suggesting a "practice laboratory" where students could put the knowledge they gained
from a course into effect. See Charles W. Joiner, Teaching Civil Procedure: The Michigan
Plan, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 469 (1953).
5 In 1993, the law school was awarded a grant by the Department of Education
(D.O.E.) to refine the then-existing Law & Psychiatry and Immigration Law component
clinics, and to create two additional live-client component clinics. The Housing Law Clinic,
in which the students will deal with landlord tenant issues, will be the last clinic developed
under this grant. The Trusts & Estates Clinic was begun with a start-up grant from the
Estate Planning Council of Seattle.
[Vol. 2:1
HeinOnline  -- 2 Clinical L. Rev. 2 1995-1996
Seattle University's Integrative Curriculum
range of doctrinal courses, tying each student's drafting experience to
the subject matter of the particular course in which he or she is en-
rolled.6 Additionally, simulated one-credit "lab" courses are offered
in conjunction with Criminal Procedure and Evidence. These lab
courses are one-credit parallel simulations in which students work
through a case ifie. They perform lawyering exercises (interviewing,
case theory analysis, oral argument, counseling, etc.). They develop
an understanding of particular doctrinal issues but do so in a context
similar to that of a practicing lawyer. Presently, eight members of the
faculty are working on books designed for use as either texts for the
separate one-credit lab courses, or as material which will allow tradi-
tional professors to integrate a series of realistic lawyering problems
into their substantive classrooms. 7 These texts are designed to accom-
pany courses in Administrative Law; Agency, Partnership, and Lim-
ited Liability Organizations; Antitrust; Business Planning;
Corporations; Environmental Law (NEPA); Family Law; Pensions,
Compensation and Benefits; Real Estate; Secured Transactions; and
Securities.
STRucruRE OF LAWYERING SKILLS CURRICULUM
Legal Writing
Program Simulation Program Live Client Program
Integrated Freestanding Integrated Freestanding
Legal Writing I Crim. Pro. Lab Comprehensive Immigration Law Practice
Pretrial Law Clinic (Civil and
Advocacy Criminal)
Legal Writing II Evidence Lab Comprehensive Law & Judicial
Trial Advocacy Psychiatry Externships
Advanced Legal Drafting Lab ADR Professional Non-Judicial
Writing Responsibility Externships
Business Negotiations Trusts and
Planning Estates
Skills Appellate Health Law
Development Advocacy
Series
Student Housing Law
Competitions
Even those on the faculty who are not directly involved in the
projects accept this evolution, many enthusiastically.8 Faculty teach-
6 The lab courses are taught by a variety of people: the regular classroom teacher,
another regular faculty member, or adjuncts.
7 These texts will comprise the Seattle University Skills Development Series, to be
published by The Michie Company.
8 Cooperation and coordination between clinical and traditional faculty, aside from
Fall 1995]
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ing Evidence and Criminal Procedure recommend the corresponding
labs to their students. Others whose classes have been conjoined with
live-client components have allocated class time to discussions of non-
confidential aspects of the cases in the related clinic, have attended
hearings, and even have changed portions of their syllabi. Several
other faculty members have asked that we develop components for
their class. Student response has similarly been enthusiastic. All
clinical offerings have been over-subscribed. 9 Even the regular, free-
standing clinic had the longest waiting list in its fifteen-year existence.
Three years ago, none of this parallel, integrative curriculum ex-
isted. What then happened?
B. An Unlikely Locale for Widespread Curricular Change
Reader expectations at this point are likely to be something like
the following story. A new, visionary leader emerges, exhorting her
colleagues to move into action in response to the MacCrate Report.'0
improving the overall quality of all participants' workplace experience, enrich both individ-
ual and institutional pedagogy. This notion was poignantly expressed in Margaret M. Rus-
sell, Beginner's Resolve: An Essay on Collaboration, Clinical Innovation, and the First-Year
Core Curriculum, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 135 (1994):
Without such bridges-between clinicians and non-clinicians, theorists and practi-
tioners, doctrinalists and anti-foundationalists-law teachers rapidly become pige-
onholed "specialists" of the worst kind. Their "specialization" relies not on the
intellectual strength and promise of what they do know, but rather on their inability
or unwillingness to connect that expertise to substantive areas and methodologies
with which they are unfamiliar. The ultimate losers in such a scenario are, of course,
our students, who are left to piece together an already fragmented and imperfect
course of study with the disconsolate thought that, in the end, their teachers neither
grasp nor even particularly care about attempting to make the fragments approach a
coherent, complementary whole.
In this essay, I urge my fellow law teachers, especially other non-clinicians, to
resist the seductive elitism of such self-segregation and to consider ways in which our
classroom teaching might derive enormous benefit from cross fertilization with theo-
ries and methodologies from across the various "Divides" of our legal educational
landscapes.
Id. at 138.
9 This experience is consistent with the findings of The Report of the Committee on the
Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 529 (1992) that offering more than
two live-client clinics increases the student demand for a clinical experience. In this regard,
choice of clinical subject matter does seem to make a difference to our students in that
students are not just interested in a clinical experience, but in having that experience in a
particular doctrinal and/or practice area.
10 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NAR-
ROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereafter cited as "MacCrate Report" for the Task Force chair,
Robert MacCrate]. The fault lines in legal education that are currently being shaken by the
MacCrate Report were clearly envisioned in 1953:
My next prophecy is that legal education will continue to struggle with the prob-
lem of practical education, and will almost surely not solve it to the satisfaction of
[Vol. 2:1
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Endless faculty meetings, curriculum committees, subcommittee stud-
ies, difficult "struggles" over institutional direction and values, faculty
retreats, white papers, and meetings with students follow, leading to
eventual consensus, a school fight song, and the parallel, integrative
curriculum.
In fact, none of this happened.
In assessing what did happen, it is crucial to understand that the
emergence of the integrative curriculum and its aftermath was no
more likely to take place at Seattle University than at many of the law
schools in the country.
Like so many other law schools, Seattle University has a rela-
tively large student body (850-900) and is for all practical purposes
totally tuition funded. Thus, though the number of faculty are ade-
quate, most resources are needed to cover the core curriculum of
traditional substantive subjects. In sum, any significant curricular pro-
grams one tries to make available to any significant portion of the
student body will tend to stretch the budget, simply because there are
so many students and the school has little money to spare.
Further, the school is a little over twenty years old, with many of
the founders and those from the early years still teaching on the
faculty. These faculty, and even the majority of younger faculty whom
they hired, form a core of fairly traditional Socratic teachers." They
are as a group excellent, but again basically traditional. The Socratic
modality is, in fact, the institutional norm for the substantive curricu-
lum, a norm enforced through promotion and tenure decisions.
Historically, the faculty has hardly been wildly supportive of
clinical education, particularly the live-client clinic. In past years, this
clinic was perceived as an appendage to the budget, and a very expen-
sive appendage at that. Many saw the clinic as lacking intellectual
rigor, smacking of the notion of a trade school, and serving as a refuge
for the less academically capable who took the clinic in an effort to
avoid the "difficult" courses.
everyone. Some practicing lawyers will continue to be disturbed that the young grad-
uate does not know how to make out a replevin bond the day he leaves the law
school. Others will be less concerned, but will still feel that the neophyte in practice
is left a rather innocent article after his law school experience.
Erwin N. Griswold, The Future of Legal Education, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 438, 443 (1953). See
also Arch M. Cantrall, Practice Skills Can and Must be Taught in Law School, 5 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 311 (1953).
11 On the other hand, virtually all faculty at Seattle University use some lawyering sim-
ulations in their courses, though this might be a single drafting exercise. Some of the
faculty, particularly the younger faculty, have incorporated extensive simulations into their
substantive courses by using ongoing case files, in some instances with a single case file
providing the narrative for two separate substantive courses (e.g., torts or contracts and
civil procedure).
Fall 19951
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Those charged with administering the lawyering curriculum have
little formal political power in the institution. None of the current
live-client clinicians have ever been on a tenure track. Currently three
of us are on long-term contracts, a fourth on a D.O.E. grant. We are
liked by the rest of the faculty, but we have no particular power within
the formal processes of the institution (other than one clinician, one
vote, excluding tenure matters). The simulated program, while ad-
ministered by a tenured faculty member, carries even less formal clout
since the freestanding Comprehensive Pretrial and Trial Advocacy
Programs are generally taught by adjuncts.
Finally, while the faculty all get along and are generally very nice
people (considering that they are law professors), there exists no clear
consensus on an institutional vision, let alone on the role of clinical
education. In short, there was no great likelihood of widespread cur-
ricular reform in the direction of the MacCrate Report at Seattle Uni-
versity, and, in fact, no one was even calling for it.12 So again, what
happened?
In Part II, we present our theory for why the parallel, integrative
curriculum initially spread and is now accepted at the law school. In
Part III, we discuss why this curriculum is pedagogically sound. Fi-
nally, in Part IV, we describe the philosophy, methodology, and logis-
tics of the live-client and simulated parallel, integrative components.
II. WHY THE CURRICULUM HAS BEEN ACCEPTED
Without two preconditions, none of what happened would have
been possible. First, we had a forward-looking, supportive Dean. At
our school the Dean has the power to approve any course on an ex-
perimental, one-time basis without referral to the faculty. Under this
authority, the Dean approved the first two live-client components
(Law & Psychiatry and Immigration Law) and the first two simulated
components (Evidence and Criminal Procedure Lab). Only after the
courses had actually been taught and proved successful were they then
subject to formal faculty vote for adoption into the regular curriculum.
12 It has always been recognized that changing a curriculum is no easy matter. Accord-
ing to Woodrow Wilson when a university president, "Changing a curriculum is like trying
to move a graveyard." Frank I. Michelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Cur-
ricular Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352, 352 (1982). Thus, one author characterizes his
vision of wholesale curricular change as "unrealistic." See Robert S. Redmount, The
Transactional Emphasis in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 275 (1974). For a well
thought out list of reasons why "significant curricular reform" is so difficult, see Lewis D.
Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum Reform in Law Schools: A Critical Assessment, 24
TOLEDO L. REv. 1, 35-38 (1992). Yet, in spite of this, there have been schools that have
restructured their entire curriculum to reflect the skills and values perceived to have been
needed by practicing attorneys. See id. at 27-35 (describing Mercer and Montana
programs).
[Vol. 2:1
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Under these circumstances, this review turned out to be non-contro-
versial. Second, we got along with the traditional faculty, and though,
again, many were skeptical about the cost and methodology of clinical
education, none was overtly hostile (i.e., we had no active enemies).
While these preconditions were necessary to avoid certain failure,
they did not move us very far towards likely success. That success was
a result of organizational dynamics and program design. It is to these
two concepts that our discussion now turns.
A. Informal Paths, Momentum, and an Organization within
an Organization
1. Informal paths. What in retrospect was the beginning of the par-
allel, integrative curriculum began informally on a colleague-to-col-
league basis.13 First, a clinical professor obtained the Dean's
permission to teach the simulated Evidence and Criminal Procedure
Lab. Next, the first live-client component was created when several
clinicians presented the concept to a senior professor in the regular
faculty, who taught Law & Psychiatry. Ironically, that professor was
among a group that historically had been skeptical of the live-client
clinic. He was, however, interested in bringing high quality lawyering
into the local mental commitment process, and saw the component
clinic as a means to that end. He was also open-minded. The success
of the pilot live-client Law & Psychiatry component clinic earned his
enthusiasm for the endeavor.
For the most part, the rest of the curriculum has similarly devel-
oped without formal committees, studies, or faculty meetings. 14 All
13 The notion that the best way to bring change in the law school curriculum is through
informal collaboration between groups and individuals working along the periphery has
been articulated by a number of others:
I agree with Paul Brest that we had better rely on individual or group initiative, not
faculty mobilization, for those concrete innovations in educational practice that may
or may not show the way to actual improvement. To be quite honest about it, I do
not want to be mobilized any more than I suppose many of the rest of you want to be
mobilized. I also, however, do not want to be atomized.
Michelman, supra note 12, at 356. See also Paul Brest, A First-Year Course in the "Law-
yering Process," 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 344, 351 (1982) (in the process of discussing "Curricu-
lum B", a major renovation of the first-year curriculum, the author describes a Welfare and
Housing Law seminar that was the product of such one-on-one faculty cooperation);
Redmount, supra note 12, at 280-81 ("The basic structure and substance of legal education
may not change much, and its tendency is to gradually assimilate new ideas rather than
develop a different character. There is, however, noticeable change in peripheral training
possibilities.").
14 Again, the only formal faculty involvement consisted of approving (unanimously)
the permanent inclusion of the Evidence and Criminal Procedure Labs, and the Law &
Psychiatry and Immigration component clinics in the curriculum. Of course, over time,
issues will arise requiring faculty input, guidance and decision, such as budgetary requests
for expansion of the program with a permanent new hire, or standards for evaluation.
Fall 1995]
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was done informally, working directly with individuals, or with groups
as in the case of the Skills Development series project. This we be-
lieve is an important perspective for those who would seek curricular
innovation, at least in most current law schools.
Faculty members, when at formal meetings, are not necessarily
the same people they are in one-to-one encounters, or at least they do
not project the same aspect of their persona. In formal meetings,
faculty carry personas that must be preserved, and long histories that
must be perpetuated. Their actions have symbolic significance, tying
them to various wings and groupings of the faculty and placing them
on certain sides of ongoing institutional debates. Formal meetings
also carry the possibility of formal institutional precedents, a possibil-
ity coloring each position taken.'5 Thus, at the prototypical faculty
meeting, the institutional consequence of even the smallest action is
subjected to minute and endless analysis by a faculty trained and prac-
ticed in just such sport. Finally, the lines of hierarchical status, which
are impliedly but constantly reinforced in formal settings in an institu-
tion like ours (e.g., clinicians are on contract and are limited in the
subjects on which they may vote at meetings), alter the peer relation-
ships between regular and clinical faculty which otherwise exist
outside the meetings.
All of this leads to the same conclusion. Work one to one. There
will be someone in the traditional faculty who will be willing to work
on such a project, and likely far more than one. With respect to more
ambitious visions, we have developed the theorem of Forty-Sixty:
With the cooperation of forty percent you can offer many students an
exposure to a different educational experience than they would other-
wise have received, provided none of the other sixty percent affirma-
tively try to block the efforts. The best way, in turn, to insure that
none of this sixty percent will do so is to leave them alone, and ask
nothing of them as individuals or in a formal setting. From our experi-
ence, so long as the project has plausible academic merit, most faculty
couldn't care less about what is done so long as they do not feel that it
15 This disparity between the nature of formal personas at law school meetings, and the
informal ones encountered in the hallways, is hardly a phenomenon unique to law school
faculties. Over 100 years ago, one of the central creators of the conceptual foundations of
social psychology and role theory, William James, wrote:
Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who
recognize him and carry an image of him in their minds.... But as the individuals
who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as
many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opin-
ion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different
groups.
William James, "The Consciousness of Self", 1 PRIrNCIPLS OF PSYCHOLOGY, Chapter x,
281-82 (1981 ed.).
[Vol. 2:1
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is being done behind their backs, they are not asked to do any more
work or alter their classes, and you are not trying to obtain any signifi-
cant moneys from the budget.
2. Momentum. We tend to think of the law school in terms of its
factions (e.g., clinical or traditional) or groupings of individuals. Yet
at heart it is an organization, albeit a loose association of independent
contractors or a partnership of would-be latter day monks. And orga-
nizations are alive, not static. They breathe and that breath vibrates
along the threads connecting its complex network of relationships and
ever competing and evolving sets of norms and conventions.' 6 Thus,
once the Law & Psychiatry clinical component pilot project was a suc-
cess, subtle supportive movement from ordinarily skeptical cells of the
organization began, and a slow momentum started to shift the orienta-
tion of the organization.
3. An organization within the organization. This subtle momentum
was fragile, and the larger organism was prone to return to its previ-
ous norm, unless some force was applied to assure that the momen-
tum would continue in its current direction. As one of the only
coherent organizations that exist within the law school, the clinical
faculty were in a position to first maintain and then accelerate this
16 Organizations are increasingly being viewed as something other than a machine op-
erating in a sphere unconnected to the human reality of those who work within it. Gilsinan
and Valentine attribute this "organization as machine" metaphor to the functionalist para-
digm that "has generated most management and organizational theory." James F. Gilsinan
& James R. Valentine, Bending Granite: Attempts to Change the Management Perspectives
of American Criminologists and Police Reformers, 15 J. POL. ScI. & ADMIN. 196, 200
(1987). Noting that this functionalist approach has been "rapidly losing ground" in organi-
zational theory, the authors embrace the interpretive approach. Id. This "perspective views
organizations as systems of meaning. People actively structure their organizational reality.
Thus organizations act primarily as interpretive lenses through which people assign mean-
ing both to their own activity and to the activity of others." Id.
Organizations are complex playing fields where organizational structure and organiza-
tional values interact, with competing and emerging values vying for dominance. WILIPAM
GORE, ADmnmsTRAIvE DECISION-MAKING: A HEURISTIC MODEL 119 (1964).
Perhaps this function of structure can be characterized as one of rationalizing indi-
vidual belief and maintaining faith in the efficiency and worth of the organization.
The result of continuous changes in structure is a continuing reinterpretation of the
organization and its environment and hence recurrent reinforcement of individual
commitments to the numerous symbols of organization. Major changes in structure
seem to come about when a sudden buildup of anxiety manifests itself in a hurricane
of feeling which topples an organization over its threshold of change into a precipi-
tate act. Change may also come about through a more casual continuing process of
adjustment, with several issues in revision at any given time, each being shepherded
along at a rate consistent with tolerably comfortable levels of anxiety.
Id. at 122. A similar view is expressed in Gilsinan & Valentine regarding the "interpretive
perspective" of organizational theory. Gilsinan & Valentine, supra at 200-01.
Fall 1995]
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momentum. 17 Many clinicians have bemoaned the isolation of the
clinic from the traditional law school with its separate space, separate
staff, and separate faculty.' 8 But take a look at this from another per-
spective - that of power, not its lack.
Faculty committees and their membership come and go, and meet
infrequently. The faculty as a committee of the whole ceases to exist
the moment the meeting is adjourned. But the clinic is literally an
ongoing organization, particularly if it contains more than one clini-
cian. We have our own space, our own support staff, and our own
computers, fax machines, photocopiers and other resources. We work
together as a team, are already set up to efficiently produce large
quantities of work, and can generally meet whenever we wish. We are
therefore capable of developing action plans and strategies, bringing
concerted focus to a goal, and conducting appropriate follow-up. 19 In
short, the clinic is a logical locus for initiating the momentum for cur-
ricular change. In saying this, it is important to understand that we
are not talking about some cabal secretly manipulating matters behind
the backs of the traditional faculty. Quite the contrary. All of our
efforts have been out in the open and have required both the coopera-
tion and the trust of the regular faculty with whom we work. It is
rather that as an entity we can generate quality work products quickly.
Our clinic took the lead in developing the parallel, integrative
curriculum. We initially selected appropriate areas and then con-
tacted faculty. We next created and supervised the pilot projects, and
finally we obtained a D.O.E. grant to expand the program. Similarly,
a clinician wrote the initial Evidence and Criminal Procedure Lab
texts,20 made contacts with a publisher, organized the meetings of
17 The legal writing program is also a separately managed, well-structured organization.
Since it relies on instructors who remain for at most three years, however, it does not
maintain the organizational continuity of the clinic.
18 Historically, the clinic has operated peripheral to and as an "add-on" to the tradi-
tional curriculum. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Curricular Structure and Faculty Struc-
ture, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 326, 331-32 (1985) (clinics peripheral to the law school); Steven
H. Leleiko, Clinical Education, Empirical Study, and Legal Scholarship, 30 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 149, 150 (1979); Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach With
Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDuC. 241, 246-47 (1992) ("Law school clinics can give students
this training, but clinics are at the fringe of legal education, usually reserved for a small
number of third year students."); But see Stephen F. Befort, Musings on a Clinical Report:
A Selective Agenda for Clinical Legal Education in the 1990's, 75 MmNr. L. REv. 619, 632-
33 (1991) (integration is happening or has occurred at many school but progress is uneven).
19 In fact, in many respects the live-client clinic has the properties of an organized inter-
est group, with all of its capacities. Cf James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public
Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTI=t-
TiONAL ECONOMY 3 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988). The organiza-
tional structure of a particular simulated or field placement clinical program will determine
whether it possesses these same attributes and capacities.
20 Professor Mitchell co-authored the texts with Rick T. Barron, Senior Trial Deputy in
[Vol. 2:1
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teachers of substantive courses who would write texts in the Seattle
University Skills Development Series, and currently serves as editor
for the series.
The organizational focus by the clinic, though necessary, was not
alone sufficient to maintain growth of the curriculum. Rather, the de-
sign of the curriculum was essential to its continued momentum and
lack of opposition.
B. Design
1. The three elements of the design. The design of the parallel, in-
tegrative curriculum is founded on three elements:
" The courses all begin as one credit.21
" The component is offered parallel to the substantive course,
with contemporaneous enrollment in the substantive course being the
only prerequisite for the clinical component. Conceptually, we visual-
ize the concept as two boxes, a large one to be filled with the material
of the substantive course and a small one hovering above to be filled
with the substance of the clinical components.
e The components are offered in conjunction with upper-level
courses.
2. A closer look at the elements.
a. One-credit courses. Many consequences flow from the
courses being limited to one credit. First, faculty do not seem to get
troubled by their creation. Psychologically, one credit seems of little
consequence in the curriculum. Practically, these courses do not eat
up much of the 90 credits students must take for graduation. As such,
the curriculum existing prior to the creation of these component clin-
ics remains intact, contributing to a paradox: In some sense, the
whole curriculum is changing, yet in an equal sense, nothing has really
changed.
Second, from a student perspective, students who would not be
willing to commit 4-6 credits to a clinical experience are willing to do
so for one credit. This is particularly so when the subject area is one
that interests the student. Put another way, the one-credit compo-
nents allow students to delve into live and simulated clinical exper-
iences and still have plenty of credits left over to take traditional bar
the Santa Barbara, California, Public Defender office.
21 In the past year, two professors who teach the related course have inquired whether
students should get two credits for the live-client components. While this would alter the
initial design, such change is consistent with the broader conception of flexibility and cur-
ricular evolution. See infra Conclusion.
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courses, upper level seminars, and the like.22
Third, the one-credit format allows us to provide clinical exper-
iences to a far greater number of students than would otherwise be
possible with existing resources. The simulated components can ac-
commodate 24-50 students while still being pedagogically effective.
Each live-client component takes 12 students, working in teams of
two. For one credit, each team does one case. That makes six cases
per live-client component clinic which must be supervised. A full-time
clinician can readily supervise two such clinics a semester (6 cases
each, 12 total), as does one professor in our clinic.23 Thus, a single
clinical faculty member can provide a meaningful and intense, live-
client clinical experience to 48 students a year.24
b. Parallel to underlying substantive course. Central to the wide-
spread acceptance of the clinical components is that they are con-
structed to be parallel to, and not literally integrated into,25 the
underlying course.26 Whatever one's ideal of the "integration" of law-
yering into the traditional curriculum, there are two reasons that we
believe make the parallelism aspect of the design essential.
First, one must keep in mind who traditional teachers tend to be,
particularly the more senior tenured faculty, who collectively wield
considerable power over the direction of the institution. While a sub-
stantial percentage of our faculty has practiced law, and many are
22 At Seattle University, students also find that the availability of some one-credit
courses is useful to them when planning their schedules.
23 Almost immediately, some parlayed their view of the economic implications of the
MacCrate Report, supra note 10, to declare the MacCrate Report enterprise wholly unfea-
sible, and thus stillborn before it could begin. See John J. Costonis, The MacCrate Report
Of Loaves, Fishes, and the Future of Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1993). By
creating one-credit courses, and pairing students in "teams" in the live-client components,
we have substantially diluted the pessimistic vision of economic impact portrayed by Cos-
tonis. For an excellent discussion of placing students in teams, see David F. Chavkin,
Matchmaker, Matchmaker: Student Collaboration in Clinical Programs, 1 CLIN. L. REv.
199 (1994).
24 Most of these one-credit live-client and simulated components are taught by full-
time clinical faculty, with the exception of the component on professional responsibility,
which is taught by Professor Strait of the traditional faculty. The simulated components,
however, could readily be taught by practitioners who serve as adjuncts. The number of
student teams that can be supervised in a live-client component, on the other hand, may be
limited by student practice rules which apply in almost all trial court settings, but in few
administrative areas. Also, since real clients are involved in the latter, standards of profes-
sional responsibility demand more intensive supervision than in simulated programs.
25 For discussions of "integrative" curricula, see, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain & Michael E.
Solimine, Skills Skepticism in the Postclinic World, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 308 (1990);
Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Really Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 57 (1992).
26 Some field placements also fulfill aspects of this parallel function. While the primary
supervisors in such externship clinics will be practitioners, the clinician can mediate be-
tween traditional teacher and practitioner, thereby attempting to bring all three together.
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even currently involved in practice, we believe that what follows is a
fair description of the career landscape of the traditional faculty at
most schools. For many, their experience with practice is limited to a
few years researching in a large law firm that followed a few years
researching for some appellate or supreme court.27 They thus have
limited knowledge or understanding of practice, let alone the day to
day workings and conventions of particular local systems.28 Their re-
action to being asked to speak about real practice tends to be discom-
fort. To be asked to actually participate in it evokes an emotional
spectrum ranging from disinterest to fear. Though the former reaction
may be some psychological mechanism to ward off the latter, the point
is that many law professors have little interest in practice. 29 Their
conception of themselves is as "theoretician. '30 Many even look
27 An interesting study of the practice backgrounds of law professors was published in
Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors,
25 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 191 (1991). According to the study, clerkships were not only com-
mon (30% of professors had clerked), the prevalence of this experience actually increased
in the 1980's. Id at 208. As to actual practice, of those entering practice in the 1980s, 80%
overall had some practice experience, with the numbers dropping to 63% at the so-called
elite schools. Id. at 217, 219. This is an overall increase from 67.2% in the 1970s. Id at 218.
The average years of experience are 5.4 years, with only one-quarter having more than 5
years experience. Id. at 217, 219. The study did not, however, distinguish between clinical
and non-clinical faculty. As to the more senior faculty, prior to 1960, 38.2% had some
private practice experience represented by a mean of 1.2 years on their first job. Id. at 221.
Those professors currently in their thirties and forties who have worked in private practice
average 2 years experience.
28 Understanding local conventions, the unwritten rules and procedures, is obviously
important to effective practice. Thus, in a study of bankruptcy attorneys and the bases for
their choices whether to counsel Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, Professor Braucher found that
"[tjhe study suggests that local administrative practices and legal culture have more effect
on choices in consumer bankruptcy than do features of the law conventionally thought to
be important to chapter choice. Bankruptcy law is put into effect through a system of local
administration that produces great variations, both formal and informal, from place to
place. Each city has its own culture, to which lawyers react differently: some assimilate and
others resist it." Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cul-
tures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 503, 522, 580 (1993). See also Bergman, supra note 4, at
361-62 (". . . it has become apparent that an agency-based clinical program can be an
excellent base from which to examine aspects of agency process otherwise largely ignored
in law school. Those aspects are all the informal considerations which play such a large role
in agency life.") (footnote omitted).
29 Traditional professors generally have become true academics, uninterested in prac-
tice. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance
Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1236 (1991). The apparent
lack of interest of many traditional law professors in areas of inquiry touching upon actual
practice and adjudication has been the subject of stinging commentary by Judge Harry
Edwards. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REv. 34 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Dis-
junction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MicH. L. REv.
2191 (1993).
30 The proposition advanced in this study is that this division [among factions, wings,
and so-called movements within the faculty] does not arise from differences of opin-
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down on, or out and out dislike, practice and its practitioners. 31 In
this regard, one of the authors vividly remembers his first day as a
visiting professor in the faculty lounge of a so-called "top ten" law
school. The Dean introduced him, noting that he was "interested in
teaching how practicing lawyers think about and use doctrine in their
area." There was a pause, and then a professor (who was later to
become Dean) slowly replied, "Oh, I wasn't aware that practitioners
thought." End of conversation.
Moreover, even professors-who, like most of the non-clinical
faculty at Seattle University, are not hostile or indifferent to prac-
tice-might nevertheless find the thought of participating in actual
practice or supervision unnerving. This is hardly surprising or unwar-
ranted. They're right. It is frightening. And, when we really think
about the client responsibility and anticipated ego blows, it is un-
ion or attitudes among law professors. Were that true, movement should be discern-
able. Rather, the differences arise from the very manner in which law professors
perceive themselves and their profession. Each law professor has a distinct self-im-
age, or self-persona.
Douglas D. McFarland, Self Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in Legal
Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 233 (1985) (footnote omitted). The traditional class-
room teacher's persona is that of theoretician or "traditional legal scholar":
In response to arguments by practicing lawyers and judges that students are not
being prepared in skills necessary for the practice of law, the traditional legal scholar
might recite the example of the most effective swimming coach of all who paid little
attention to strokes and kicks but spent all training time in body building and physi-
cal training. Or the traditional legal scholar might reply with a derisive snort, "Then
our law schools would become trade schools, and we shouldn't kid ourselves about
it." Perhaps in a slightly better mood he might argue that a law school cannot teach
tricks of the trade because teachers are not actively engaged in the trade to keep up
with the latest tricks, or that these how-to-do-it things can be better taught in prac-
tice by those who spend full time on them. The answer lies at the heart of the vision
of the traditional legal scholar. The law school exists to teach students how to think
like lawyers. The law school does not exist to teach students to be lawyers.
Id. at 239 (footnote omitted). As Owen Fiss put it, "Law Professors are not paid to train
lawyers, but to study the law and teach their students what they happen to discover." Let-
ter from Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington, in correspondence collected in Peter W.
Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1, 26 (1985).
31 According to Judge Edwards, too many academicians still disdain practice. See Harry
T. Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
285, 293 (1988). See also Edwards, supra note 29. In this same vein, one commentator
noted when discussing interviews of potential faculty candidates that, "In fact, practitioners
may be held in disdain. The quality sought is experience in learning law rather than practic-
ing law." McFarland, supra note 30, at 233, 240.
An analogous remark was made when discussing legal scholarship:
First, scholarship about skills is perceived as "nuts and bolts" and merely de-
scriptive, with little intellectual content. Worse, it is tainted with the aura of the prac-
tice of law, a topic disdained by many law school professors.
Peter Toll Hoffnan, Clinical Scholarship and Skills Training, 1 CLrN. L. Rnv. 93, 108
(1994)(emphasis added).
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nerving for even those of us who know (or at least think we know)
what we're doing. Adding into the mix that these professors know
that they don't know what they're doing makes their reaction emi-
nently reasonable. Further, even if they do know something from a
few years of practice, it will not be enough given the nature of law
professors. Law professors do not want to do anything where they
don't think they know what they're talking about.32 They read five
law review articles to give them background for a single point in class.
They're only comfortable in making a point if they can answer follow-
up questions three levels deep. Don't ask them to teach lawyering, let
alone supervise a real case. They simply will not believe that they are
qualified to do so, and they may well be right. Of course, there will be
exceptions among senior faculty and increasingly among newer
faculty, but generally the above will hold true.
Second, one must look at practicalities. Even if the professor ad-
mires practitioners, feels that teaching good practice is the goal of the
law school, supports clinics, and is even a bit fascinated by practice,
the professor is unlikely to alter his or her course to significantly inte-
grate even simulated lawyering skills. Professors have their courses
put together. 33 They've refined them for years. They have their notes
and hypotheticals. They know how to teach the classes and feel they
teach them well. They feel that there is barely time to cover what is
32 One example of this general unwillingness to enter areas in which professors lack the
confidence that they can perform well is the so-called "pervasive approach" to teaching
professional responsibility. Repeatedly, we have read cogent arguments and seemingly suc-
cessful experiments with respect to this approach. See, e.g., Norman Redlich, Law Schools
as Institutional Teachers of Professional Responsibility, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215 (1984);
David T. Link, The Pervasive Method of Teaching Ethics, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1989);
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992). Why
then hasn't this eminently sensible and proper position truly caught on? Most likely be-
cause all too many professors feel no confidence in the area and may not in fact be compe-
tent to teach these subjects. See James E. Starrs, Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont via the
Pervasive System, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 381-82 (1965); Rhode, supra at 52. On the other
hand, with Professor Rhode's new ethics text containing problem sections tied to individ-
ual doctrinal courses (and teaching notes to match), the pervasive method may begin to
flourish. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PER-
vASIvE METHOD (1994).
33 An analogous idea was expressed by Professor Peter Gross:
The principal obstacle, from which I think most others flow, is the fundamental
polarity between the individual teacher, on the one hand, and the collegium on the
other.
Each teacher designs and teaches his or her own courses, with minimum influ-
ence thereon by the collegium. The individual teacher's participation in the col-
legium-through contributing and voting at faculty meetings, and engaging in
committee work-is generally quite peripheral to his or her professional life.
Peter W. Gross, On Rescuing the Three Year Generalist Program, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249,
267-68 (1977). Cf. Hazard, supra note 18, at 326 (curriculum doesn't change because basic
structure of the faculty doesn't change).
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needed and, in fact, wish that the curriculum committee would recom-
mend that another credit be added to their course.34 Again, they are
not about to change their course.
The concept of parallelism in the component design answers all
the above concerns: No real additional work for the non-clinical
teacher is required, while at the same time an unthreatening view of
the process is offered where the professor can come only as close to
real practice as s/he wishes. Thus, a typical initial conversation with a
professor about creating a live-client component will generally go as
follows: .
CLINICIAN: We were thinking about offering a clinical component for
12 people in your class. What do you think?
PROFESSOR: I'm sorry, I just don't have time to do a lot of extra work.
I'm on the dean search committee ...
CLINICIAN: It won't be any extra work.
PROFESSOR: Right!
CLINICIAN: No, really. All we need from you is to let us come in the
first class for 10 minutes to explain the clinical component
and answer questions. From time to time we may ask you
to pass out some information or make an announcement,
but that's it.
PROFESSOR: That's it?
CLINICIAN: Yeah. We have a weekend training workshop and we'd
love to get your ideas, but only if you have time. We'll put
together the workshop and conduct it.
PROFESSOR: What about supervision? I wouldn't feel comfortable...
CLINICIAN: We supervise. We'll send you summaries of the cases
which might form the basis of hypotheticals or class
discussion. We will also tell you when there are hearings if
you want to attend.
PROFESSOR:
CLINICIAN:
PROFESSOR:
CLINICIAN:
PROFESSOR:
CLINICIAN:
PROFESSOR:
Am I expected to go to these hearings?
Absolutely not.
Now I don't get to the subject matter of the clinic until
two-thirds through the course. Do I have to change my
syllabus?
Only if you want to. It's your class.
And that's it?
Oh, one more thing.
Ah, hah!
34 Cf Solomon, supra note 12, at 37 ("faculty members face competing demands for
time [and] ... [tlhe faculty may be concerned that developing innovative approaches to
teaching will result in lost time for scholarship").
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CLINICIAN: No. No big deal. At the end of the semester, have lunch
with me and the clinic students where we'll discuss their
experiences. Then, after the students leave, we'll talk for a
few minutes about how this all went, consider what we
might add or change, and such.
PROESSOR: That's it?
CLIMCIAN: That's it.
c. In conjunction with upper level courses. These types of simu-
lated and live-client components could obviously be added to first-
year subjects. We have chosen not to do so in our design for a number
of reasons. Tinkering with the upper-level curriculum is far less con-
troversial than altering the first year,35 particularly since there is some
informal consensus in the national profession that the second and,
particularly, the third year are the weakest part of the traditional cur-
ricular design.36 Most importantly, the first year at Seattle University
35 From the perspective of curricular design, the first year of law school generally is
viewed as the most successful of the three law school years. See, e.g., Curriculum Report
Prepared by the School of Law of the University of South Carolina, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 528,
530 (1971). In fact, historically one did not touch the first year, except perhaps to remedy
omissions by adding courses. See Donald Kepner, The Rutgers Legal Method Program, 5 J.
LEGAL Enuc. 99, 99 (1953). Nonetheless, curricular innovations in the first year date back
over forty years, see David F. Cavers, The First Year Group Work Program at Harvard, 3 J.
LEGAL Enuc. 39 (1950); Donald B. King, Legal Aid Combined With Legal Writing for First
Years, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 111 (1958), and have more recently sprung up throughout the
country. See Solomon, supra note 12, at 5-13, 19-27 (cataloguing experiments with con-
tent and scope of the first-year curriculum).
36 The upper-level curriculum has been subject to repeated criticism. See, e.g., Walter
Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 5 (1964) (case
method is boring and inadequate when repeated over and over again); Harrop Freeman,
Legal Education: Some Farther-out Proposals, 17 J. LEGAL EDUc. 272, 273 (1965) (third
year useless, boring); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Text-Problem Form of the Case Method as
a Means of Mind Training for Advanced Law Students, 12 J. LEGAL Enuc. 543, 546 (1960)
(upper-class boring, time would be better spent on "what lawyer should do"). Cf. Harry G.
Henn & Robert C. Platt, Computer-assisted Law Instruction: Clinical Education's Bionic
Sibling, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423, 423 (1977) (computers can help alleviate the boredom in
the upper level). All of the above is well summarized by Professor Gross, supra note 33, at
266:
The first criticism, then, and a point which has been sounded with vehemence
for over three decades, is that the upper curriculum is excessively information-ori-
ented; that it imparts details of no apparent relevance to an overall process of stu-
dent development; and that at the same time it fails to impart a set of skills
significantly broader than those "case analysis" skills purportedly taught in the first
year.
A second, related, problem with the upper curriculum is that it lacks coherence.
The student is confronted with an array of individual courses which defy the con-
structing of a coherent sequential program of skills and knowledge development.
A study done of entering students at the University of New Mexico Law School in 1967
revealed that "[g]enerally, the students are optimistic, even idealistic, about their future
profession and its role in society. Furthermore, most of the students seem to have brought
with them basic attitudes of honesty and respect for the law." Cleopatria Campbell, The
Fall 1995]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Clinical L. Rev. 17 1995-1996
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
is a fixed curriculum with no electives. Any alterations would there-
fore involve formal curricular change and reform. In other words,
committees, faculty meetings and other such events that run directly
contrary to our commitment to organizational change through infor-
mal paths.
III. WHAT ARE OUR PEDAGOGICAL GoALs?
A. Who Are Our Graduates and What Do They Need?
The key insights of the MacCrate Report for us were not only the
list of skills known as the Statement of Skills and Values (SSV), but
also the realization that different law schools turn out students for dif-
ferent types of practice.3 7 The traditional curriculum is underlain by
Attitudes of First Year Law Students at the University of New Mexico, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC.
71, 81 (1967). These days, however, are not the early '60s. The job market is tight and
student debt is high. Watergate is part of the culture and lawyer jokes are as close as the
nearest party. Nevertheless, our first year students seem little different than these. By the
time they leave, however, much of the optimism, idealism, and respect is dissipated. Some-
thing isn't right.
37 Because the profession is diverse, a law degree is frequently depicted as provid-
ing its holders with a high degree of professional mobility and flexibility. Yet, over
the years, placement statistics from any given law school disclose that the percent-
ages of their graduates who enter specific professional niches are fairly predictable.
Graduates of "national" law schools tend to enter practice with large firms; gradu-
ates of many state and region-oriented schools are apt to enter practice in small or
medium size firms, or even in solo practice. The choice of law school attended corre-
lates strongly with the range of professional career options exercised by students at
graduation and may circumscribe or expand the variety of career options available.
MacCrate Report, supra note 10, at 226 (footnotes omitted). At Seattle University, 44.8%
go into private practice. Of these, 14.8% are in solo practice, while 19.4% are in firms of
2-10. Only 4% go to firms over 50. See Report to Board of Visitors (Nov. 12, 1993) (on file
with authors). Accordingly, although big firms train their new associates, see Johnson,
supra note 29, at 1245-46, only 1 out of 25 Seattle University graduates will be given this
type of opportunity for post-graduation training in their field.
The continued growth in the number of lawyers in solo and small-firm practice is
an indication of continued vitality in this segment of the profession in its latest roles.
The absence of an established structure is both the attraction and the drawback of
such practice. The ABA Task Force on Solo and Small Firm Practitioners adopted
the statement of its witnesses: "The biggest problem that solos and smalls have is
isolation." Graduates entering such practice seldom have an experienced attorney to
whom they may go for advice, nor do they have access to training programs in which
to learn on the job. Without mentor, collegial support or on-the-job training, the
lawyer needs to reach out for assistance while attempting to establish a professional
network on whom to call.
It is not surprising that successive assessments of the profession have found that
the smaller the setting in which beginning lawyers practice, the more they rely on
their legal education for learning practice competencies. However, one frequently
heard plaint is that law schools in preparing students for practice give greater atten-
tion to the needs of those lawyers entering practices in which they will serve the
business community than to the needs of those entering practices in which they will
provide legal services to individual clients. The transition from law school into indi-
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the tacit assumption that graduates will go into large firms, but in fact
most graduates go into small firm or solo practice, and these latter
groups of graduates need to acquire some sense of how to practice
upon graduation, but generally lack any meaningful opportunity to do
so. 38 Like a large percentage of law schools in the country, most of
Seattle University's graduates will go into small firm or solo practice.
Thus, we cannot rely on some firm to train them and slowly acclimate
them to client representation. They must hit the ground running, and
our curriculum must give them a fighting chance.39 For reasons articu-
lated below, we believe the parallel curriculum also will be beneficial
to those anticipating a big firm or public service career as well.
B. The Conceptual Foundations of the Component Clinic
Pedagogy40
Four concepts underlie the curriculum:
vidual practice or relatively unsupervised positions in small offices, both public and
private, presents special problems which the law schools and the organized bar must
address.
MacCrate Report, supra note 10, at 46-47 (footnotes omitted).
38 In some fundamental sense, the very issuance of the MacCrate Report by a less than
radical committee, representing the ABA and AALS, is a statement of what every practi-
tioner knows: Marginal representation is the norm, incompetence is prevalent, and it can-
not continue to be ignored. See also Johnson, supra note 29, at 1232-33 (commercial
practice has changed, is different than students expect, and students are completely unpre-
pared for it); Edwards, supra note 29.
39 Even with the best law school preparation, we firmly believe that graduates who
enter solo practice must maintain constant access to attorney expertise and/or mentoring.
40 Initially, one may criticize this curriculum as having no clear structured sequence,
and that in many respects it appears random. We understand and do not object to these
reactions. It is our position that neither the lack of sequencing nor apparent randomness in
any way devalues the pedagogical effectiveness of the parallel, integrative curriculum.
While in some sense this curriculum could be characterized as sequenced, with the first
year primarily focused on analysis and doctrine and the second and third on understanding
lawyering in context, we acknowledge that it is not sequenced in the way that term is
normally used, such as, William & Mary's "CSD" model, see James E. Moliterno, An
Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing the Lost Benefits of the Apprentice
System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CrNl,. L. REv. 83, 122 (1991), and that discussed
by Johnson, supra note 29. The curriculum does not, for example, move the students from
simulated lawyering in their first year to in-house five-client clinical instruction and
externships in their second and third years. It does not build on tasks, carefully sequencing
instruction to add complexity. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TAsK FORCE
ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: Tim RoLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 15 (1979)(Cramton Report)
("The curriculum should be coherent, presenting students with problems of progressively
greater scope and challenge which allow them to utilize skills and knowledge previously
acquired."). See also Solomon, supra note 12, at 17. There is no structural ascension
toward specialization with cornerstone and capstone courses. See Kristine Strachan,
Curricular Reform in the Second and Third Years: Structure, Progression, and Integration,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 523 (1989) (detailing a plan for specialization tracks, including
"cornerstone" and "capstone" courses). In fact, the parallel, integrative curriculum does
not even assure that every student will be exposed to every MacCrate Report Skill and
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" Lawyering in context;
" Plateauing;
* Clear, limited objectives;
* Classroom and curricular "pop."
1. Lawyering in context. By this concept, we mean that students be-
gin to appreciate the roles and dimensions involved in lawyering by
experiencing what lawyers do in a variety of contexts, each circum-
scribed by both an area of substantive doctrine and the perspectives of
the particular practice area.
In many ways, each component clinic is a lawyering microcosm.41
While each component covers different doctrine and often different
practice skills, each contains many of the same fundamental perspec-
tives on lawyering-client-centered representation and client voice,
the centrality of ethical conduct, adversarial and strategic thinking, the
essential functions of planning and preparation, development of op-
tions, fall-backs, and back-ups, and so forth. Thus, whichever compo-
nent the student takes, he or she will learn basic, core lessons.
Value. Rather, the curriculum generally offers the opportunity for a wide range of choices,
experiences, and exposures. This in turn leads to the claim of randomness.
Now such randomness is not in itself necessarily a bad thing. With a sufficient number
of such experiences, the student will assimilate a substantial repertoire of lawyering skills
and knowledge base. After all, a student's education is defined by the total educational
experience upon graduation. Also, there is simply no way we could expose the students to
"everything" about lawyering, whatever that would mean. Moreover, even if through
prudent use of a magic wand we could provide such exposure, that would not mean that
the students could actually function as competent attorneys when doing this "everything."
Nonetheless, one could fairly question whether this lack of sequencing and seeming
randomness is no more than the mirror image of the lack of sequencing and random
experiences of the traditional law school curriculum. Put another way, by literally tying
our clinical components to the existing traditional curriculum, haven't we merely added
some clinical spice to an inherently flawed pedagogical construction? Fair question, and an
important one. We believe, however, that the four concepts underlying the curriculum
answer such pedagogical doubts.
41 In his presentation on "Addressing Skills and Values Issues in Lawyer-Client Rela-
tionships: Skills Training, Variations in Practice Settings and in Characteristics of People,"
given at the 1995 AALS annual meeting in New Orleans, Professor Frenkel emphasized
the importance of exposing students to a wide range of practice contexts. See also Work-
shop materials, at 17 (on file with authors). In sharp contrast to this model, the dominant
law school context is that of the professional academician; in effect, students are being
trained to be law professors. Johnson, supra note 29, at 1259. That is problematic in light of
Richard Abel's observation that "the little we know about what lawyers do suggests that
they make scant use of their formal legal education." RICHARD L.-ABEL, AMERICAN LAW-
YEas 22 (1989). For example, in litigation-oriented components, students are repeatedly
exposed to strategic planning in an adversary context. See Berger & Mitchell, supra note 3,
at 834. Whatever the doctrinal area, every component clinic will carry this same, funda-
mental lesson: "Students will be more successful not because they can speak well or argue
more persuasively, but rather because they can structure facts and law into a compelling
and theoretically sound case." Steven Lubet, Advocacy Education: The Case for Structural
Knowledge, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 721, 734 (1991) (footnote omitted).
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Further, under our model, the context for study of doctrine
moves from the world of expert law teachers to that of expert law
doers. This is significant. Perhaps one of the most serious failings in
contemporary legal education is that all too many students graduate
with a vast doctrinal base of knowledge sealed within a context that is
not translatable to practice. You will meet them on the streets a few
years out of law school and they will exclaim that (other than the
clinic, if they took it) law school was a make-believe world that had
nothing to do with practice. All they've learned, they've learned since
graduation. They are dead wrong, of course! Without all those large
Socratic classes, they would hardly be functioning as the professionals
they are. The problem again is that they did not understand the place
of doctrine and doctrinal analysis in resolving a particular issue or ac-
complishing a certain task as the setting was moved from classroom to
office. Like a small child who does not recognize her teacher when
she sees him in the mall, the neophyte does not recognize what they
know when it appears in a different context.
Law, however, is always there, always defining the context, yet
fluidly appearing and disappearing like the Cheshire cat. That is what
students must comprehend. To say that "this is not really a legal prob-
lem; these neighbors just need to talk" is to simultaneously postulate a
course for the dispute other than the formal process. It is to envision
the costs and consequences of taking that alternative course, the con-
stant specter of the formal process which threatens to translate private
relationships into formal rights and duties should the neighbors fail to
work this one out at someone's kitchen table. Similarly, at a deposi-
tion, case theories circumscribed by doctrinal elements will initially
guide the questioning. Then interpersonal and communicative skills
take the front and law seems to disappear. Suddenly, "Object. Attor-
ney-client privilege. I instruct the witness not to answer." Law reap-
pears. Then a response: "Maybe there's another way I can get at
what I need. Let me ask your client this . .. " Negotiations of a sort
take the fore, with law disappearing again. But law is always there,
appearing, disappearing, reappearing. Experiencing the actual use of
doctrine in a variety of practice settings teaches this most fundamental
lesson.42
There is much to support the parallel, integrative curriculum in
current learning theory. We all actively participate in creating mean-
42 Ironically, the clinical components enhance the students' perception of the relevance
of the underlying doctrinal course by placing it in a practice context where students can
appreciate its significance. By making themselves participants in a joint endeavor with the
clinicians, moreover, the traditional faculty member is far less likely to be perceived by her
students as unconnected to the reality of practice.
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ing from what we experience by placing this experience into concep-
tual constructs, commonly known as schema or schemata.43 Experts,
such as experienced practicing attorneys, store large quantities of in-
formation in expert schemata. These schemata not only facilitate stor-
age and retrieval of large chunks of information, they organize the
information in a way that is meaningfully connected to the types of
tasks and operations that must be carried out." This allows the expert
to create sophisticated problem representations from data by calling
upon appropriate (or analogous) schemata, and then drawing upon
the stored knowledge base within the schemata to formulate a solu-
tion. In doing this, the expert will apply "pattern recognition" for sim-
pler problems,45 quickly sifting the relevant from irrelevant. For more
43 For an extraordinarily rich and deeply researched discussion of how experts use cog-
nitive models/structures in developing problem representations and solutions, see Gary L.
Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of
Theory (unpublished manuscript, 1995) (on file with authors). See also Berger &.Mitchell,
supra note 3; James F. Voss, Terry R. Greene, Timothy A. Post, & Barbara C. Penner,
Problem-solving Skill in the Social Sciences, 17 PsYCHOL. LEARNING & MOTIVATION 165,
191-212 (1983). Further elaboration of the basic cognitive processes of making meaning
through interpretive frameworks, generally referred to as "schema theory," can be found
in Richard C. Anderson, The Notion of Schemata and the Educational Enterprise: General
Discussion of the Conference, in SCHOOLING AND THE AcOuIsrmON OF KNOWLEDGE 415,
419 (Richard C. Anderson, Rand J. Spiro & William E. Montague eds., 1977); Robert
Glaser, Education and Thinking: The Role of Knowledge, 39 AM. PsYCHOL. 93 (1984);
John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Consid-
ers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 275, 277-83 (1989); David E.
Rumelhart, Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition, in THEORETICAL ISSUES IN
READING COMPREHENSION 33 (Rand J. Spiro, Bertram C. Bruce & William F. Brewer
eds., 1980); see also JEAN PIAGET, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (1932)
(presenting cognitive, as opposed to behavioral, theory regarding child development).
The concept of schema theory has begun to appear in the legal literature in discussions
ranging from juror decision-making processes to the role of metaphor in legal reasoning.
See Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 273 (1989); Richard Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, What We Talk About
When We Talk Law, 37 N.Y. L. SC. L. REV. 9, 38 (1992); Richard Sherwin, Preface to
Lawyering Theory: Thinking Through the Legal Culture, 37 N.Y. L. Sc-i. L. REv. 1, 1
(1992); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cogni-
tive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2225, 2234 (1989).
44 "[T]here is strong evidence that what makes an expert is not the quantity of his or
her detailed knowledge, but the quality of its organization. The knowledge of experts is
organized in ways that permit an expert to recognize in complex situations patterns that
are entirely invisible to novices." Blasi, supra note 43, at 5. Accord Glasser, supra note 43;
Anderson, supra note 43.
45 Expert "pattern recognition" is exemplified by studies of chess masters. See, e.g., A.
DEGROOT, THOUGHT AND CHOICE IN CHsSS (1965). Expert trial advocates also apply this
mode of conceptual construction. See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amend-
ment, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215, 1293-1301 (1994) (describing how public defenders use
"patterns" in representation).
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complex problems, the expert will create "mental models" 4 out of
existing schemata that can be run like computer models to test vari-
ables and consequences. 47 In contrast, the novice (law student or be-
ginning attorney) will react principally to the surface elements 48 of the
problem, constructing a superficial problem representation, then in-
discriminately drawing upon an undifferentiated mix of relevant and
irrelevant information.49
Offering students a variety of live-client and simulated practice
contexts in which to deal with a range of lawyering problems is a rea-
sonable methodology for instilling expertise. From the various exper-
iences, students begin to develop a range of lawyering schemata and
begin to appreciate the great number of dimensions to real world
problems.50 In the simulation components, the students are repeat-
edly asked to enter the thought processes of the expert's world; in the
live-client components, they are asked to fully participate in that
world. Again and again they spiral and cycle back through situations
demanding expertise.51 Always, there is context, and in imparting ex-
46 Plainly, however, some problems are too complex to yield a solution by the
processes of problem recognition and solution retrieval. The problem situation may
contain many different subproblems, thus evoking many different schemas. Very
likely a particular problem will not fit precisely with any of them. The problem situa-
tion may change over time, both as the result of actions taken by the problem-solver
and as the result of changes invoked by other actors or the environment. One set of
theories that help explain how people handle the resulting information processing
load assumes the existence and use in problem-solving of "situation models" or
"mental models." The relation between the concepts of schema and mental model is
less than precise. Although the structure and form of a mental model can be derived
from schemas, mental models are different from schemas in that they represent ob-
jects and processes that are specific and unique, as opposed to those that are categor-
ical, prototypical, or metonymic. In this sense, mental models are comprised of
schemas with the variables filled in, that can then be "run" in simulation according to
expectations supplied by a script. Thus we may have a schema for restaurants in
general, but an image or mental model of eating lunch with Lucie at a corner table in
the Thai restaurant on 3rd Street.
Blasi, supra note 43, at 36 (footnotes omitted). See also P.N. JoHNsoN-LAiRD, MENTAL
MODELS (1993); William F. Brewer, Schemas Versus Mental Models in Human Memory, in
MODELING CoGNrnON 187-98 (Peter Morris ed., 1987).
47 See JOHNSON-LAIRD, supra note 46, at 15.
48 See Voss et al., supra note 43, at 191-212.
49 See Blasi, supra note 43, at 21.
50 Blasi, supra note 43, at 98. For a concrete example of this proposition, see Braucher,
supra note 28, at 556:
Lawyers for consumer debtors are not driven purely by financial factors such as
maximizing income and minimizing credit risk from nonpayment of fees. Other con-
cerns that influence them are the local legal culture, their status aspirations, and their
views of their appropriate professional and social role, including their perspectives
on the causes and functions of consumer bankruptcy and on what is meaningful
about their work.
51 Through cycle and spiral, experience begets theory, which affects interpretation,
which begins the cycle again. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spira" The Ethics of
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pertise, "there is no substitute for context. '52
2. Plateauing. In teaching lawyering skills, we have noticed that stu-
dents often experience a quick initial jump in understanding, followed
by slower periods of incremental refinement, then followed by an-
other jump and so forth. We call this "plateauing," and it is hardly
unique to legal education. Think about learning to play some sport,
let's say tennis. To start, you couldn't hit the ball over the net. Then,
there was suddenly a moment when you "got it," got the feel, the
sense, and you could hit the ball over the net into the other court.
You made a huge jump, probably relatively quickly, and found. your-
self on a plateau looking down on where you'd just been. But then it
may take months of playing and practice to become significantly bet-
ter. It is slow, sporadic and incremental. Two steps forward, one
back. Then one day, you're at a totally different level. You not only
can consistently hit the ball over the net, you are playing the game.
This notion of plateauing is particularly important in the one-
credit simulation components. One hour the students may counsel a
client, and the next conduct a negotiation, an interview, or a cross-
examination. One may well ask how students can get any value out of
these exercises without extensive readings and careful training. After
all, many schools have full semester courses in interviewing and coun-
seling alone. As will be explored in Section IV, teaching these law:
yering skills as such is not the primary purpose of the component.
Rather, the primary objective is to contextualize the underlying sub-
stantive doctrinal course by exposing students to how practicing law-
yers in the field think about the doctrine in the context of, e.g,
interviewing and negotiations. Nevertheless, because of "plateauing,"
the students also learn quite a bit about the skill that is worthwhile for
its own sake.
For example, consider interviewing and counseling. One of the
central criticisms of practitioners that has led to the emergence of the
philosophy of client-centered lawyering in legal education5 3 was the
Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MNN. L. REV. 1599 (1991). In this regard, the models
of cognitive science give scientific foundation to the intuitively insightful notion of the
"reflective practitioner" espoused in DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECrIVE
PRACrITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN OF TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFES-
SIONS 13 (1987).
52 Blasi, supra note 43, at 97; see also id. at 143 n.270:
There is a growing body of evidence that all learning is highly situated and context
dependent. JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, SrruATED LEARNING (1991); D.N. Perkins
& G. Salomon, Are Cognitive Skills Context-Bound, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 16 (1989).
53 For an articulation of the "client-centered" approach, see, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER &
SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED AP-
PROACH (1977), and a later edition of the book, DAVID A. BINDER, SUSAN C. PRICE &"
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simple perception that all too often practicing lawyers do not listen to
their client's wants, needs, and voice,54 instead constraining the cli-
ent's world into the lawyer's legal categories. Merely to understand
and assimilate this concept puts the student on a different plateau, for
the problem that has led to the focus on client-centered representa-
tion is, in significant part, one of role conception. In the past, students
left law school with a role conception that they were expected to know
it all and take charge. If instead you tell them that, while they must
know a great deal and take much responsibility, ultimately it is the
client's case and that they must, therefore, work with the client to de-
termine and carry out the client's wishes, most students will attempt to
conform their conduct to this norm. "Oh, so that's what you want me
to do-Sure, I can do that; I just didn't understand before that that's
what's expected." Significantly, this type of plateau-raising lesson can
be transmitted in an exercise or two, particularly if repeated in other
components and classes in the curriculum. Of course, there are levels
upon levels of interpersonal skills, theories, techniques, and ethical
quandaries in interviewing and counseling that are understood by the
good practitioner, but getting students to this initial plateau is a signif-
icant and meaningful jump.
3. Clear, limited objectives. As the previous section indicates, we do
not try to do everything. To attempt too much in a one-credit class
leads to superficial treatment and winds up accomplishing nothing.
With one credit, you have to focus. This principle guides the construc-
tion of both the live-client and simulated components. The live-client
components are intended to provide students with a window into
the world they are studying,55 thus really being clinics for the class-
PAUL BERGMAN, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLENT-CEnrRED APPROACH (1991). For
commentary on this approach, see, e.g., Serena Stier, Reforming Legal Skills: Relational
Lawyering, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 303 (1992).
54 For discussions of the concept of client "voice," see Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 1, 21-32, 45-52 (1990); Clark Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About
Law as Language, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2459,2465-69 (1989). For another view of the role of
the client in case theory, see Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 485 (1994).
55 Much of what comprises "law" fails to surface in the traditional doctrinal course.
Little, if anything, is seen at the trial court, let alone law office, level. See Louis M. Brown,
Teaching the Low Visible Decision Processes of the Lawyer, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 386, 386
(1974). Unwritten rules, conventions, informal processes and the like are rarely acknowl-
edged, see Bergman, supra note 4, at 361-62, in spite of their importance in the actual
operation of law. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 28; Kenneth Culp Davis, Behavioral Sci-
ence and Administrative Law, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137, 145 (1964) ("Decisions that govern-
mental administrators make are not limited to the merits; they also involve pressures,
timing, methods, personalities, resources, relationships, and politics. Only a tiny minority
of decisions come up in orderly fashion as do decisions in adjudications.").
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room.5 6 The simulated components are meant to provide a link be-
tween the substantive course and practice by teaching how lawyers
actually "think about" the doctrine in the particular practice area.57
a. Live-client component clinics. In a live-client component
clinic, students only have one client and all students have cases with
similar contours. With that in mind the particular lawyering skills to
be emphasized can be narrowed. Thinking in context as an expert or,
as we more often say, "thinking like a lawyer" will be enhanced.
Moreover, the interplay of the clinic and the class should foster the
objectives discussed below.
(1) Framework. As we all know, clinics have often grown spiritu-
ally and even physically apart from the regular curriculum. This ten-
dency towards isolation is, however, misguided. Theory informs
practice, and theory is informed by practice.5 8 In the integrated cur-
riculum, each component clinic implicitly carries this important
message in a powerful way. After all, an entire area of substantive
study (the traditional course) is simultaneously being perceived by the
Students with a commercial bent are given no sense whatever of the commercial law
firm as a business enterprise. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 1232-33, 1238-39. The concrete
significance of exposing students to the "real world" was well expressed by Bergman, supra
note 4, at 359:
But the fieldwork experience allows students to learn agency procedures not
only theoretically, but also realistically. The importance of this cannot be over-
stressed. After all, statutes and court decisions notwithstanding, consumer law for
the vast bulk of the American public is what the public agencies are able to enforce.
For example, students learn that the Attorney General's Office has the power to
require advertisers to submit substantiation for their ads. But in what situations is
this power exercised? Do the agency attorneys possess sufficient expertise to ascer-
tain whether data supports a certain claim? Does the agency have a policy to police
ads in certain types of businesses, or are decisions made on an ad hoc basis? [foot-
note omitted]
56 While 89% of live-client clinics have some classroom component, Report of the Com-
mittee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDuC. 508, 529 (1992), there is
only a scattering throughout the literature of the notion we are espousing in our live-client
components, Le., clinics to support the doctrinal classroom. See, e.g., Fox & Schwabb, supra
note 4 (students in bail seminar bring experiences from field back into class); Thomas J.
Andrews, The North Carolina Sentencing Seminar: An Experiment in Controlled Clinical
Legal Education, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 317 (1977). Cf Gross, supra note 33, at 272
(noting that clinic is most valuable when "exploited" for benefit of total law school pro-
gram). After all, clinical cases offer live-client "texts" which may be studied along with
conventional texts. See David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its
Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 67 (1979).
57 For a full discussion of the logistics and methodology for the live-client and simu-
lated components, see Part IV infra.
58 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 12, at 352 (law school teaches too much doctrine,
not enough theory and practice). Cf. Tomain & Solimine, supra note 25, at 316-17
(bemoaning the fact that skills are not tied to a broader, political perspective).
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students and the faculty through the lens of practice in that area (the
component clinic). Thus armed with a perspective and a framework
that they likely never have had before, students approach traditional
law school fare with a different level of excitement, and the usual la-
ment of law school malaise in the upper level curriculum is dramati-
cally lessened.
(2) Respect for the client. Because students are simultaneously
reading cases and practicing in the world about which they are read-
ing, they will not regard the cases as espousing merely abstract legal
principles. For example, in the Law & Psychiatry Clinic, the students
have a real client whose voice and story must be understood and
translated with respect for the client, yet within the constraints of the
law and procedures of the forum. One simply cannot predictably con-
trol, guide or manipulate those whose mental processes are other than
those to which we are accustomed. In re Smith now has a client-cen-
tered meaning because students "know" Jennifer Smith.
Similarly, in the Immigration Clinic, students face clients from
very different cultures, with different languages, who have undergone
experiences that are likely unimaginable to most of us living in the
United States. The client is the only one who can really tell the story.
The client has the only "voice" that can convey authentic experience.
Again, the students' role cannot be to impose their voice on the client.
Rather, it must be to translate the client's voice to the court.
(3) Cross-fertilization. There are many clinics around the coun-
try with classroom components, some of which focus exclusively on
skills and others of which combine skills instruction with coverage of
the underlying substantive area. Generally these classes are taught by
clinicians. These are classes for the clinic; they support the students'
efforts in their clinical representation. Although the traditional class-
room instruction students receive in our integrated clinics no doubt
helps them in performing in the clinical component, our model of the
clinic-classroom relationship is primarily designed to achieve the goal
of enhancing the students' perspectives on the legal doctrines they
study and apply. By experiencing the doctrine in practice, students
gain insights that they bring back to the classroom and that enlighten
discussions by providing illustrations, points of departure, hypotheti-
cals, and a window into the world. 59
59 One does not need to extol the possibility of scholarship evolving from the clinical
experience, Leleiko, supra note 18, since the very existence of this journal is solid evidence
of that reality. Rather, for the traditional legal scholar, the existence of a clinical compo-
nent to their course offers an opportunity. In traditional law review articles, appellate
courts are the only world in which law is done. Yet most law happens in worlds generally
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b. Simulation components. Some of the concerns underlying
the design of the simulation components mirror those already dis-
cussed in conjunction with the live-client ones. The simulation com-
ponents tend to diffuse the so-called dichotomy between theory and
practice, expose students to a wide range of practice contexts, and
broaden the skills base (i.e., adding skills such as judgment, imagina-
tion, and personal communication to cognitive skills). Other con-
cerns, however, though no doubt touched upon to an extent in any
component clinic, regardless of whether live or simulated, were more
consciously at the philosophical center of the creation of the simula-
tion components and texts.
(1) Looking at cases from the beginning "up". Exclusive use of
the traditional case method as an approach to substantive areas en-
gages students in a process which begins at the end of the appellate
level and looks "down." This one perspective can be extremely mis-
leading. Most law is practiced at the point prior to trial (or non-litiga-
tion activity), looking "up." In this upward-looking perspective,
appellate cases are often viewed not so much as sources of authority
to resolve disputes, but guides for future activity (e.g., What must I
plead? How should I present my witness at this motion in order to
come within the Miranda principle? What must my declaration state
in order to get a court-appointed expert?, and so forth). Further,
when looking from the trial level "up," issues are not solely confined
to the analysis of the four corners of an appellate opinion. Issues are
often "created," "evolved," and/or "framed." The facts are not a static
concept when viewed from the trial level "up." 60 They are sought,
invisible to legal scholars, Le., lower courts and administrative agencies and law offices. See
Mitchell, supra note 45, at 1216 (most citizens' experiences with the formal criminal law
will be in the lower courts); Brown, supra note 55, at 386. By monitoring the cases student
handle in the live-client clinical component, professors of the substantive courses can use
this window into the real world to glimpse cutting-edge issues and perspectives that they
can address in scholarship. After all, lawyers in the trial courts were arguing about the
substance of Miranda for decades before it reached the Supreme Court.
60 As Professor Louis Brown explained in describing a set of experimental law school
courses,
Because a significant aspect of the work of the planning lawyer is the planning of
facts, much of the approach concerns fact. The choices which a client must exercise
are often (always?) choices of fact. By way of comparison with traditional case
materials (appellate decisions where the facts come to the appellate court-and to
the student), these teaching materials present facts in a state of flux.
Louis M. Brown, Experimental Preventive Law Courses, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 212, 213
(1965).
Taking this notion that facts are unstable or in flux from Professor Brown's transac-
tional world to that of litigation, it can be said that,
[e]xperienced [trial] lawyers tend not to think in terms of "facts." Rather, lawyers
think about facts as information that supports, harms, or is neutral to their case.
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developed, characterized, and made part of a record. The labs pro-
vide this dynamic, upward-looking perspective.
(2) Ends-means thinking. Substantive law classes wrestle with
"What 'does' this case mean?" Practicing attorneys, viewing cases
from an adversary, ends-means perspective, wrestle with "Knowing
my client's objectives, what could I 'plausibly' argue this case means?"
The labs develop adversarial, 61 ends-means thinking in analysis.
(3) Teaching recurring "patterns". Traditional law classes provide
recurrent "patterns" of case analysis (e.g., What did the case hold?
Why? Was the court's reasoning correct? Is that result consistent
with previous cases?). Practicing attorneys likewise have recurrent
"patterns" (e.g., What is my theory of the case? How does this case or
fact affect my theory? What will I argue? What will my opponent
respond? How will I counter? What other information do I need?
Why?). The sequenced questions in the labs provide "patterns" appli-
cable to both the specific substantive area and to practice in general.
4. Classroom and curricular "pop". How much can students learn in
one credit? You'd be surprised. They get a great deal from that single
credit. As we say, one credit carries a lot of "pop." There are a
number of reasons for this.
Immersion into the outside world exposes students to forces that
Thus, facts represent supportive information, or a lack of information, or create in-
ferences. Using a combination of substantive evidence and rhetoric, experienced law-
yers try to keep out information harmful to their case, gain admission of that which is
helpful, draw and actively place a favorable gloss on the resulting inferences, and
wrap it up in a narrative that convinces the judge or jury of their position. Thus, to
trial lawyers, there is no such thing as the "fact" of an eyewitness identification. In-
stead, they see a set of information: A particular person (a witness), with particular
perceptual abilities and biases, who can put forth particular words from the witness
stand, about a particular event he or she claims to have perceived, under particular
circumstances.
In approaching this witness, opposing expert lawyers will attempt to add, sub-
tract, recombine, and recharacterize this information to support the story they want
the judge or jury to accept. For example, the prosecution might attempt to create the
tale of a vigilant citizen who would never accuse an innocent man of a crime. The
defense, on the other hand, might tell of a well-meaning citizen who was so fright-
ened by the event that his senses temporarily failed him. By seeing the world as one
in which information, lack of information, and inferences compose the universe, the
advocate is constantly watching what others would call "reality" dissolve. The advo-
cate then recreates that reality within his own rhetorical framework.
Mitchell & Berger, supra note 3, at 831-32 (footnotes omitted).
61 Interestingly, 35 years ago, Professor Howard L. Oleck recommended teaching tradi-
tional substantive law through having students adopt adversary positions. Apparently, he
had used this model for the previous thirty years. See Howard L. Oleck, Thirty Years of the
Adversary Method, 13 J. LEGAL EDuc. 83 (1960).
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demand learning, regardless of any demands from the law school.
This is true for the live-client components. Even though the objec-
tives of these clinics is not only to develop lawyering skills but to pro-
vide students with a "window" into the practice/institutional world
they are studying in class, students who are going to conduct a hearing
or negotiation, necessarily have to prepare for that hearing or negotia-
tion. Under such "realities," and with the guidance of the clinic
faculty, they wind up developing advocacy skills within the framework
of the lawyering task(s) they must carry out for their client. That's
pop, especially since students generally do far more than one credit's
worth of work in the live-client components. They do not complain
(very much), and almost never at the end of the course, because they
appreciate the opportunity.
In the simulated components, the students often get a stronger
grip on the material in the underlying doctrinal course than those en-
rolled solely in the substantive course, both because the material is
placed in a meaningful context and, frankly, because they have added
an hour a week to their study of the subject. Additionally, in this one
credit, they simultaneously obtain a pretty good sense of how practic-
ing lawyers "think about" doctrine in the area, learn the types of tasks
and problems lawyers in that area face and the mental approaches to
these tasks and problems, and in the process accumulate some of the
expert knowledge-base upon which lawyers in the area draw (e.g.,
practical considerations in representing the lead tenant in a shopping
mall; what questions to ask when preparing a witness who will testify
about "chain of custody," etc.).
To gain another perspective on this concept of pop, approach it
from a course selection perspective. Student #1 takes a regular three-
credit upper division course, a well-taught, thought-provoking course.
Student #2 uses her three credits differently. She takes a one-credit
simulated Corporations component and two one-credit live-client
components, say the Immigration and Health Law clinics. We are
only talking about three credits, three out of ninety credits needed for
graduation, 3.3% of the students' total academic law school experi-
ence. Yet the difference in how they used this 3.3% may profoundly
affect these two students' overall law school education. From our ex-
perience, Student #2 will, all else being equal, understand far more
about lawyering and be better prepared to enter practice than Student
#1.
The concept of pop can also be viewed from a full curricular per-
spective. Curricular "pop" is another way to articulate the paradox of
"change and no change" we've already mentioned. The traditional
faculty changes nothing. They teach the same course and teach it in
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the same way if they wish. Students still have plenty of credits avail-
able to take bar courses and advanced seminars. All tinkering is
around the periphery. But, as we've just seen, this tinkering changes
the breadth and relevance of the student's education. It also joins
traditional faculty to the worlds of lawyering (and clinicians) through
the traditional faculty member's acceptance of the parallel, integrative
curriculum, whether that acceptance is tacit, overt, or active. In short,
the school simply ceases to be the same school. All is changed, but
almost nothing has been changed. That is curricular pop.
IV. METHODOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS OF THE LIVE AND
SIMULATED PARALLEL, INTEGRATIVE COMPONENTS
A. One-credit Live-client Components
1. The organizational model, or how to build your very own live-
client clinical component.
These component clinics are constructed along a seven-point
organizational model:
a. Focus on a narrow lawyering task. The clinics cover a nar-
rowly delineated, discrete part of the subject area. For example, the
Immigration Clinic covers only deportation hearings and the Law &
Psychiatry Clinic handles only 180-day re-commitment hearings. This
allows students to gain a relatively quick grasp of the issues and proce-
dures, and the supervisor likewise to gain a relatively quick grasp of
each subject. (In fact, few of the existing clinical faculty had previous
experience in either the immigration or mental health areas.) In addi-
tion, the lawyering task can be timed to go from a rational entry point
to conclusion within a semester.
b. Access to expert consultants. An attorney practicing in the
area acts as an expert liaison. In this role, the practitioner consults
with the supervisor on the cases, often helps plan and participate in
training, and may be available to counsel students.62
c. Simultaneous enrollment in substantive course and component
clinic. Students may not enroll in the integrative clinic unless they are
enrolled in the related substantive course. Clinic participants receive
one academic credit in addition to the credit granted for completion of
62 Our policy is to provide a stipend to such expert consultants. We limit their involve-
ment and ask that students approach them only through us. This ensures the consultant is
not swamped by student calls, not required to be up to speed on our cases, and that stu-
dents have prepared by discussing the issue between the partners and with faculty before
the expert is contacted.
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the substantive course.
d. Low case load, underrepresented clients. Each team of two
students represents a single client in a single case. Each clinic can
accommodate up to six clients per term per class and, therefore, up to
twelve students per class. All clients are indigent.
e. Faculty cooperation and interaction. The clinical supervisor is
always available to meet regularly with the substantive course faculty
member to discuss such matters as the progress of cases, non-confi-
dential information that may be used for class discussion, possible
changes in the class syllabus to enhance the clinic if the faculty mem-
ber so desires, and so forth.
f Training. Student participants begin with an intensive,'front-
loaded training schedule, generally including a weekend workshop
using simulation to prepare the student for the specific tasks they will
perform. 63 Depending on the particular course, this workshop may be
preceded by one or more pre-workshop sessions covering anything
from an outline of the substantive contours of the area to insight into
the institutional players the students will encounter. Comprehensive
training and resource manuals are also made available to component
clinic students.
g. Case conferences with supervisors. Student teams maintain
regular office hours, during which they meet with a supervisor from
the full-time clinical faculty for a one-hour case conference, twice per
week.
B. Simulated Clinical Components (the So-called Labs)
1. The organizational model, or how to build your own simulated
component.
a. Classroom organization. The classes are organized and
taught as follows:
(1) To enroll in the component, a student must be currently en-
rolled in the underlying substantive course (though occasionally we
have allowed students who have already taken the course to enroll).
(2) The class time is divided into two components: 1) class dis-
63 Preparation for the particular clinical task through an intensive workshop is a meth-
odology also employed by the District of Columbia School of Law. See Gay Gellhorn,
Report on a Pilot Clinical Project in Employment Discrimination: Harmonizing Pedagogy
and Client Service Goals, 92 AALS SEC. ON CUiN. EDuC. NEWSLETTER, at 19 (Sept. 1992).
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cussion focusing on particular assignments, where doctrine is analyzed
in the context of strategic, adversary planning; 2) a performance exer-
cise where students who have been organized into "firms" role-play
one of the performance problems, which is then critiqued and
discussed.
(3) The class is conducted in two-hour blocks, meeting once a
week for seven weeks, beginning in the fifth week of class (to allow
the students to "get up to speed" before the lab starts). However, the
materials are organized so that the course could begin the first week
and run one hour a week for fourteen weeks. In the Criminal Proce-
dure component, for example, 24-30 students are organized into six
"firms"; thus, each firm will participate in two performance problems
during the course. The class could be offered to 50 students, however,
with twelve firms each doing one problem. This would not necessarily
be bad. One can learn a great deal watching others and one can con-
duct a reasonable class discussion with 50 students.
b. Organization of the texts.64 The texts are at the core of our
series of simulated component courses. The texts are intended to fur-
ther our objective of providing students with a link between tradi-
tional substantive courses and the world of lawyering by focusing on
how practicing attorneys think about and use the particular substan-
tive doctrine. The texts are constructed in the following manner:
(1) The chapters of the books reflect the topical subdivisions of
typical substantive course texts in the area. Within each subdivision,
the assignments raise a variety of substantive issues in the context of
strategic decision-making and performance.
(2) The centerpiece of the books is the case file or transactional
history.65 The ongoing "story-line/narrative" is contained in a set of
realistic documents in the case file and is presented in introductions to
each assignment which place the students in the context of an active
64 The existing simulated component course offerings will be greatly expanded as the
texts in the Seattle University Skills Development Series (Michie Co.) are completed. See
supra Section I-A.
65 Rich case files are obviously at the core of a quality simulation component. We have
generally chosen a single, ongoing narrative rather than a series of unconnected, shorter
fact patterns. The idea is that students will spend the course in the ongoing representation
of a client. See also Steven Lubet, Advocacy Education: The Case for Structural Knowl-
edge, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 721, 733-34 (1991) (recommending an ongoing simulation,
in which students "work with the same case files for weeks, if not months, in succession
[r]ather than rely upon short, unitary problems," so that "case files are nuanced, complex,
and detailed," and the facts of the cases are "subject to continual reevaluation"); Mitchell
& Berger, supra note 3, at 833 (discussing the "single fact pattern approach").
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lawyering role. These files and histories are made up of an extensive
collection of realistic documents which contain the facts the students
will use to guide their representation. Here the facts of the case are
not prepackaged. Rather, like practicing attorneys, the students must
recognize, extract, and characterize information relevant for their rep-
resentation as they sift through the documents.
(3) Assignments, correlated to specific substantive issues raised
in the traditional texts, place students in a wide range of settings and
lawyering tasks. Each demands that the students act as problem-solv-
ers. All require meshing an appreciation of the particular substantive
law with a variety of lawyering skills. Unlike the so-called problem
method, these assignments go far beyond challenging students' recog-
nition of doctrine. 66 They place the students in the role of an attorney
who is actually engaged in representation of a client - a role in which
tactics, judgment, and ethics are always at play.67 Each assignment
concludes with an exercise in which the students perform some law-
yering tasks (e.g., drafting, arguing, interviewing, conducting examina-
tions, counseling, negotiating, and such). The principal point of these
exercises is not to teach the particular skill as one would in an advo-
cacy course but, again, to provide a lawyering context for what is be-
ing learned in the substantive course.68
(4) Each assignment contains a series of sequenced Planning
Questions. These questions are of two types. Many reflect "recurrent
patterns" that experienced attorneys in the area employ intuitively.
Others are specific to the issues raised in the particular assignment,
66 In 1958, Bernard J. Ward wrote about the virtues of the problem method. See Ber-
nard J. Ward, The Problem Method at Notre Dame, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 100 (1958). Shortly
thereafter Kenneth Culp Davis recommended its use in upper-level courses. Davis, supra
note 36, at 546. Now, there are a number of problem texts. See Gregory L. Ogden, The
Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654 (1984) (author presents bibli-
ography of problem texts). In fact, one commentator writes that the problem method is the
only economically feasible one to institute the goals of the MacCrate Report. See John S.
Elson, The Regulation of Legal Education: The Potential for Implementing the MacCrate
Report's Recommendations for Curricular Reform, 1 CLN. L. REv. 363, 386 (1994).
67 We do not mean that the problem method cannot be used to approach tactics and
strategy. Of course it can. See Ogden, supra note 66, at 659. It just rarely is. If, then, one is
more comfortable characterizing our texts and methodologies as variants on the problem
method, we will not object. We recognize that this places us in good company. See supra
note 66.
68 As the purpose of the simulation components is to introduce students to how practi-
tioners "think about" the underlying doctrinal area, the course is in some ways like a mod-
em language course where students learn to speak about subjects as would practicing
attorneys. See James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What A Law
School Ought (and Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 163-64 (1986) (doctrine can
be given context by having students use it as a language).
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including ethical issues. Spaces are provided for students to record
their answers. All of this is intended to take the students through the
mental process of an experienced advocate and, in the process, rein-
force the heavy emphasis that the books place on planning and prepa-
ration in the context of strategic theory.69
CONCLUSION
What has been presented in this article is a mixture of institu-
tional politics and pedagogy. As the song goes, you can't have one
without the other. The parallel, integrative curriculum offers a rela-
tively safe mechanism for ongoing pedagogical experimentation and
evaluation. It maximizes flexibility and the possibility of cross-fertili-
zation and innovation by allowing a medium for a realistic working
relationship between the clinical and traditional faculty. In doing so,
it maximizes the institutional capacity for wise curricular evolution in
a number of respects. As the profession changes and the conception
of professional training evolves along with it, the curriculum is easily
adjusted by gradually altering the content of the integrative compo-
nents. In fact, once the curriculum is in place, it might even be possi-
ble to gradually move towards actual integration, or to create a
curriculum geared towards specialization by "clustering" the compo-
nents with some as capstones or other such innovations.
For the significant number of law schools in the country which are
in similar circumstances to Seattle University, the methodology and
philosophy guiding the creation and growth of the parallel, integrative
curriculum offers a powerful model. Taken in whole, or only borrow-
ing little pieces, this model offers both a politically and economically
realistic methodology to expand students' opportunities for meaning-
ful clinical learning in their legal education. The model meets the fun-
damental concern underlying the MacCrate Report that students
leave law school with some sense of what they are doing and, in the
process, provides a structure for coordinating and combining the tal-
ents of clinicians and traditional substantive faculty. It is not the an-
swer, but it is one answer, and a good one at that.
69 The MacCrate Report's recognition of the importance of strategic problem-solving,
MacCrate, supra note 10, at 142-51, echoes the same perception by many others. See, e.g.,
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614 (1984); Robin Yeamans, Creativity and Legal Education, 23 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 381, 381 (1971) (creativity in approaching the solving of lawyering problems
"distinguishes the competent tradesman from the great lawyer"); Davis, supra note 36, at
546 (upper-level courses should train students using "what lawyer should do" problems).
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